A COHERENT AND EFFECTIVE FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY FOR THE EUROPEAN UNION?: THE CASES OF THE YUGOSLAV CRISIS AND THE IRAQ CRISIS

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Abstract

The main objective of this article is to investigate the coherence and effectiveness of the European Union’s foreign and security policy. It seeks to find answers to three main questions: how coherent is the EU in conducting its foreign and security policy?; Is coherence an essential criterion for the effectiveness of the EU’s foreign and security policy?; Does incoherence undermine the EU’s effectiveness as a foreign and security policy actor? This article seeks to find answers to these questions by focusing on two empirical case-studies, the Yugoslav crisis in early 1990s and the Iraq crisis in 2003, in which the EU Member States had acted unilaterally and incoherently and consequently undermined the Union’s effectiveness and international credibility as a foreign and security policy actor. The main argument of this article is that in order to make the EU a credible and effective foreign and security policy actor in global politics, the EU Member States have to recognize the fact that they ought to act collectively as a coherent actor and speak with one voice. Their influence on prominent international issues will be greater if they act collectively as a coherent actor rather than acting individually, and they should sacrifice their individual national interests for the sake of common interests of the EU. The EU Member States’ solo diplomacy and their diverging voices undermined the effectiveness and international credibility of the EU as observed in two case-studies.

Keywords: The European Union, Coherence, Effectiveness, Yugoslav Crisis, Iraq Crisis
1. Introduction

West European states have strove to make the European Community (EC)/European Union (EU) a coherent and effective foreign and security policy actor since the 1950s.\(^1\) During the Cold War, West European states’ early efforts to cooperate and act as a coherent actor in the areas of foreign and security policy did not succeed, because of their varying interests and approaches towards any form of cooperation whether supranational or intergovernmental. Moreover, since they have regarded their foreign and security policy as an indivisible part of their national sovereignty, they have refrained from forming such a cooperation. During the Cold War, the European Political Cooperation (EPC) which was introduced by Davignon Report in 1970 achieved limited success in maintaining cooperation among the EC Member States in foreign policy. The EPC’s main success was that the EC Member States have gained the habit of cooperation in the areas of foreign and security policy by the EPC. The EPC facilitated the adoption of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) by the EU Member States as well, and it became the predecessor of the CFSP, because most of practices and rules of it was adopted by the CFSP.

During the early 1990s, the Cold War which shaped international politics since the early 1950s had ended and with the end of the Cold War, security perceptions and security environment in Europe had changed. This led to an increase in EC Member States’ efforts to act as a coherent actor in their foreign and security policy.

In this new security environment, it was both externally and internally expected and demanded from the EC to play an active and effective role in global politics. However, the EC Member States’ failure to act as a coherent actor during the two events which broke out in the early 1990s, the Gulf War and the Yugoslav crisis, forced them to speed up their efforts to make the EU a coherent and effective foreign and security policy actor in global politics and eventually the CFSP was introduced by the Treaty on European Union in 1992.

On 11 September 2001, terrorists belonging to the Al-Qaeda Terrorist network led by Osama Bin Laden hijacked commercial airliners that destroyed the World Trade Centre in New York and a wing of the Pentagon in Washington and killed thousands of people. After

the September 11th 2001 terrorist attacks against the United States (US), the US initiated a ‘war on terrorism’ on a global scale. After 9/11 terrorist attacks, a new security milieu and security perceptions emerged; global terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, failed states and organized crime were identified as major global threats to security. Thus, in the new security milieu, the need for a more coherent and effective foreign and security policy for the EU had increased.

In early 2003, when the US decided to extend its ‘war against terrorism’ to Iraq, diverging interests of the EU Member States over Iraq led to divisions among them, as US Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld called ‘Old Europe and New Europe’. Some EU members supported US operation in Iraq such as Spain, Italy, Portugal, the United Kingdom (UK) and some candidate countries (New Europe); some opposed it such as France, Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg (Old Europe) and these divisions among them prevented the adoption of a common position towards the Iraq crisis. This undermined the EU’s effectiveness as an important actor in global politics, because they could not influence the US foreign policy and affect the course of events. Therefore, lack of coherence among them towards the Iraq Crisis undermined their effectiveness.

In this context, this article addresses three main questions. First, how coherent is the EU in conducting its foreign and security policy? Is coherence an essential criterion for the effectiveness of the EU’s foreign and security policy? Does incoherence undermine the EU’s effectiveness as a foreign and security policy actor? This article seeks to find answers to these questions by focusing on two empirical case-studies in which the EU Member States had acted unilaterally and incoherently and consequently undermined the Union’s effectiveness and international credibility as a foreign and security policy actor. The main argument of this article is that in order to make the EU a credible and effective foreign and security policy actor in global politics, the EU Member States have to recognize the fact that they should act collectively as a coherent actor and speak with one voice. Their influence on prominent international issues will be greater if they act collectively as a coherent actor rather than acting individually and they should sacrifice their individual national interests for the sake of common interests of the EU. The EU Member States’ solo diplomacy and their diverging voices undermined the effectiveness and international credibility of the EU as observed in the Yugoslav crisis in early 1990s and the Iraq crisis in 2003.
In this article, first of all, the concept of ‘Coherence’ will be examined. Secondly, two empirical case-studies, Yugoslav crisis in early 1990s and the Iraq crisis in 2003 in which the EU Member States had acted incoherently and consequently undermined the EU’s effectiveness and international credibility as a foreign and security policy actor will be evaluated.

2. The Concept of Coherence

Coherence means the action or fact of sticking together and remaining united in arguments (Abellan, 2002: 3). As a second meaning, it means the logical or clear interconnections or relation: consistency, congruity of substance, tenor, or general effect (Abellan, 2002: 3). According to Krenzler and Schneider, coherence when applied to European Foreign Policy refers to coordinated behaviour, based on agreement among the EU and its Member States, where comparable and compatible methods are used in pursuit of a single objective and result in an uncontradictory foreign policy (Abellan, 2002: 4). Abellan (2002: 9-11) also offered a tripartite categorization of coherence: horizontal coherence which refers to the coherence between different policies of the EU as well as the coherence within the EU and within the foreign policies of the Member States; that is the relation between the intergovernmental Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the supranational European Community (EC); vertical coherence which refers to the process of coherence between the Member States and the EU and vice versa; institutional coherence which refers to the coherence between the two different bureaucratic apparatus, intergovernmental and communitarian. According to Antonio Missiroli (2001: 182), coherence is more about synergy and adding value.

Jörg Monar is the one who preferred to use the term coherence to assess and evaluate European foreign policy critically (Abellan, 2002: 3). He writes the significance of unity and coherence as an important criterion for effective foreign policy in some cases, being the most important one the participation of the EU in international conferences and organizations (Abellan, 2002: 3; Duke 1999: 3). According to Monar, coherence has to find its corollary in interaction and when a policy is coherent and the interaction occurs accordingly, then all outward distinguishing marks between economic and political external relations will fade away (Abellan, 2002: 3-4). Thus, following Jörg Monar’s evaluation, Abellan (2002: 4)
thought that coherence refers to the fact that action in one sphere of European foreign policy needs to support action in another sphere and both must be interactive.

In this article, the coherence is accepted as an essential criterion for an effective foreign and security policy, and the article primarily focuses on vertical coherence that is the coherence between the Member States and the EU. In this article, the concept of coherence in EU’s foreign and security policy refers to the EU Member States’ ability to act collectively and speak with one message in several issues related to the Union’s external relations or several security issues without undermining the EU’s or each other’s efforts. It is argued in this article that the EU Member States’ coherent approach towards security or other issues related to external relations creates a synergy among them and this will enhance their influence and effectiveness in global politics.

3. The Yugoslav Crisis

During the breakdown of the Former Yugoslavia, the EC Member States lacked coherence in their approaches toward the conflict. Especially, on the issue of recognition of Croatia and Slovenia, Germany broke the consensus and on the issue of military intervention the EC Member States could not agree on a common position.

In the early days of the Yugoslav crisis, the EC Member States tried to solve the dispute through dialogue between the parties in Yugoslavia and they were committed to the preservation of territorial integrity of Yugoslavia. They advocated the establishment of a new Yugoslavia based on the principles of freedom and democracy and they also argued the Republics which wanted to secede should look for solution which kept Yugoslavian Federation together (Nuttall, 2000: 195). For the EC, a united and democratic Yugoslavia was in the interest of the Europe and Jacques Poos as the president of the Council stated that Yugoslavia “could have expectations with respect of its association with the Community if its territorial unity and integrity are safeguarded. Any other attitude could jeopardize internal frontiers in Europe” (Nuttall, 2000: 195).
Foreign ministers of the EC Member States on 24 June 1991 declared that they would not accept any unilateral declaration of independence by Croatia and Slovenia (Nuttall, 2000). They asserted that this kind of unilateral act could not solve the problem, so they would refuse to contact with secessionists (Nuttall, 2000: 197). Moreover, the EC offered to help Yugoslavia in preparing a democratic constitution and restructuring (Nuttall, 2000). Despite this declaration, Germany broke down the consensus and turned to recognition of two breakaway republics, Croatia and Slovenia, due to domestic pressure in favour of these republics (Nuttall, 2000: 202). The domestic pressure come from a large number of closely knit Croatian émigré in Germany, intensive media campaign led by Die Welt and the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, a campaign for the recognition of Croatia and Slovenia (Nuttall, 2000: 216; Wyatt-Walter, 1997: 217). As soon as they had formally declared independence, campaign for the recognition of these republics led by SPD Party and Germany’s religious bonds of Roman Catholicism with Croatia led to the public sympathy for Croatia and Slovenia (Nuttall, 2000: 216; Wyatt-Walter, 1997: 217).

Furthermore, many Germans thought that recent experience of German reunification could be achieved by the application of principle of self-determination; therefore it can be applied to situation in Yugoslavia (Wyatt-Walter, 1997: 217). Secretary General of Christian Democratic Union (CDU), Volker Rühe supported this view and said

We won unification through the right of self-determination. If we Germans think that everything may remain as it is in Europe, that we may pursue a policy of the status quo without recognizing the right to self-determination of Croatia and Slovenia, we lose our moral and political credibility…We should start a movement in the EC to lead to such recognition. It couldn’t be done alone (Nuttall, 2000: 217).

Germany also thought that recognition would strengthen the position of Croatia and Slovenia for Germany (Salmon, 1992: 252). Yugoslavia was dead and the principle of self-determination should be applied and the threat of recognition might force the federal authorities and the Serbs to be more willing to peace talks and maintenance of ceasefire (Salmon, 1992: 252). Germany attempted to convince its EC partners to come to the line of recognition and Denmark, Belgium and Italy supported the recognition; however France, the UK and the Netherlands opposed to the recognition, as they thought that this recognition
would be premature and they feared that if recognized, Croatia would then demand military assistance which would make the crisis worse (Salmon, 1992: 252). Moreover, recognition without safeguards for minorities throughout Yugoslavia would only increase the bloodshed and violence (Salmon, 1992: 252). Furthermore, for Lord Carrington, to recognize Slovenia and Croatia at this state would be to lose one of the few cards which the EC had and would destroy the chance of a successful outcome of the Peace Conference (Nuttall, 2000: 217). However, under intensive domestic pressure, Kohl in his speech to the Bundestag on 27 November made a commitment to recognize Slovenia and Croatia before Christmas and confirmed it to the President of the Croatia, Franjo Tudjman on his visit to Bonn in December 1991 (Nuttall, 2000: 218).

French President François Mitterrand thought that without agreed borders and firm guarantees for the rights of minorities, the stability in Yugoslavia could not be guaranteed and he thought that before recognition, agreed frontiers and respect for minority rights should be guaranteed and the EC should adopt a joint decision based on these principles (Nuttall, 2000: 221). Mitterrand thought that in order to prevent question of recognition from damaging Maastricht negotiations, recognition should be postponed until after Maastricht (Nuttall, 2000: 221).

During extraordinary EPC Ministerial Meeting in Brussels on the night of 15-16 December 1991, Foreign Ministers agreed to recognize breakaway republics on the basis of advice of Badinter Commission which would evaluate republics according to “the guidelines on the recognition of New States in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union” and the decision of recognition would be applied on 15 January 1992 if the report would be favourable (Nuttall, 2000: 218). The criteria for recognition included human right guarantees, guarantees for minorities, undertakings that borders would be changed only by peaceful means and commitment to non-proliferation and arms control and an additional criterion for Yugoslavia was the requirement to support the UN efforts to deploy a peacekeeping force and Lord Carrington’s EC peace conference (Salmon, 1992: 253). However, Germany, without waiting the Badinter Commission’s Report, recognized Croatia and Slovenia on 23 December 1991 as Kohl promised Tudjman, that they would be recognized before Christmas (Salmon, 1992: 253). On the other hand, as a gesture to its EC partners, Germany announced it would not
open diplomatic relations with Croatia and Slovenia until 15 January 1992 (Salmon, 1992: 253).

Badinter Commission’s Report was issued on 11 January 1992 and it posed substantial doubts whether these republics have completely met recognition (Salmon, 1992: 253). Germany’s unilateral recognition undermined the unity and credibility of the EC in the eyes of international community. Other EC Member States came to the line of recognition on 15 January 1992, because they feared from public criticism which would start if the EC Member States showed a split after having decided on a common foreign and security policy (Nuttall 2000: 222). As Simon Nuttall (2000) argued, by German unilateral recognition of Slovenia and Croatia, the EC could not speak with a single voice and this undermined the effectiveness of EPC. Roy Ginsberg (2001: 85) also maintained that Germany’s hurry to recognise Croatia without respect for the EU criteria and timetable for recognition impaired the effectiveness of the EU. This event also led to a loss of trust by Germany’s partners in the German government’s commitment to a collective policy. This also led to renewal of efforts to deepen and further institutionalize the internalization of role expectation, and a policy planning unit within the CFSP’s political secretariat was developed to provide for advance planning in response to possible crises and to forestall crisis and loss of trust (Tonra, 2003: 741). Helene Sjursen (2003, 44) also claimed that the EC Member States decided to develop stronger institutions in order to prevent unilateral act in the future.

During the Yugoslav crisis, the EC Member States were also divided on the issue of military intervention in the Yugoslav crisis. At the Extraordinary EPC Ministerial Meeting on 29 July 1992, French foreign minister Roland Dumas proposed the sending of a peacekeeping force, but other Member States did not support this proposal and in an EPC Ministerial Meeting on 6 August he proposed the use of WEU for peacekeeping force, but the UK, Denmark, Germany and Portugal opposed this, but Germany did not exclude intervention by using the EC or the CSCE (Nuttall, 2000: 211).

At the emergency meeting of the WEU Council on 19 September 1991, the Netherlands Presidency proposed the dispatch of a lightly armed force under the auspices of the WEU (Nuttall, 2000: 212). The UK agreed to studies made by the WEU, but the UK offered that forces would only be sent after ceasefire (Nuttall, 2000: 212). On 30 September
1991, ad hoc group, which was established to study armed intervention, proposed four options which included logistics underpinning of the monitors through armed escort and protection (3000-5000 men) and a peacekeeping force supporting the monitors (over 10000) to an expanded peacekeeping force (over 20000) (Nuttall, 2000: 212). Germany was hesitant about military intervention, the Netherlands declared its readiness to supply a battalion and Belgium promised its support, but the UK opposed military intervention (Nuttall, 2000: 212). Agreement on military intervention in the Yugoslav crisis was not reached because of opposition of some Member States led by the UK. The UK opposed military intervention in the Yugoslav crisis, because London believed that it was difficult and dangerous to involve into a long-term anti-insurgency operation which required 30000 troops and high causalities were likely (Salmon, 1992: 251).

Moreover, Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) on common foreign and security policy affected British opposition to an armed intervention. The UK opposed the concept of a security and defence dimension for the EC, so it opposed any armed intervention by the WEU acting on behalf of the EC which links the WEU and the EC (Nuttall, 2000: 213; Wyatt-Walter 1997: 216). Furthermore, British experience in Northern Ireland affected the British opposition to an armed intervention (Nuttall, 2000). Douglas Hurd enumerated several reasons related with Northern Ireland and for him; there was a need to avoid open-ended commitments which were sure to escalate (Nuttall, 2000: 213). Moreover, according to him, it was difficult to extract oneself once involved and it was useless to do something just for the sake of it (Nuttall, 2000: 213).

During the Yugoslav crisis, the EC Member States could not agree on a common position both on military intervention and recognition of the breakaway republics, thus the EC Member States were not able to stop the conflict and bloodshed in the region. Their lack of coherence during the crisis undermined their effectiveness and credibility. In the early days of the conflict, the statement of Luxembourg Foreign Minister Jacques Poos as the President of European Council: “It is the hour of Europe, not the hour of the Americans. If one problem can be solved by the Europeans, it is the Yugoslav Problem. This is a European country and it is not up to the Americans. It is not up to anyone else.” (Mulay-Shah, 2001: 11; Nuttall, 2000: 200; Wyatt-Walter, 1997: 213) However, these words remained on the paper, Europeans were not able to solve the Yugoslav problem, it was the Americans ultimately solved the Yugoslav
problem. As Roy Ginsberg (2002: 6; 2001: 85) suggested that the EC was baptized by fire by Yugoslav crisis and this changed the course of post-war European Integration. The EC Member States recognized the fact that civilian diplomacy not backed by hard power, which is capability of military action, would not be successful in preventing and stopping conflict (Ginsberg, 2002: 6).

Lack of cohesion among the EC Member States during the Yugoslav crisis especially in the recognition of breakaway republics and on armed intervention undermined EC’s effectiveness and international credibility. The effectiveness of the EC was undermined, because the EC Member States were not able to stop civil war in Yugoslavia and bloodshed continued until UN involved into the conflict. The international credibility of the EC was undermined, because although Jacques Poos declared it was the hour of Europe, not the Americans and the Yugoslav crisis could only be solved by Europeans, it could not turn into reality, the hour of Europe had lasted 14 months (Nuttall, 2000: 223).

Andreas Kintis (1999: 285) also shared the views that lack of cohesion among the EC Member States undermined EC’s effectiveness in the Yugoslav crisis and asserted that the fact remains that these measures failed to resolve the crisis, the EU’s limited competence in security and defence matters and more importantly, its member states’ disparate foreign policy objectives ensured that the EU’s ambition to assert its presence as an international actor was impaired by its inability to maintain common positions. Even though in its initial response to the crisis, the EU succeeded in maintaining a relatively cohesive position, its later inability to compose divergent views undermined its effectiveness (Kintis, 1999: 285).

Christopher Hill (1993: 306), in his seminal article “Capability and Expectations Gap: Conceptualizing Europe’s International Role”, expressed that Yugoslav crisis proved that the EC is not an effective international actor in terms of both its capacity to produce collective decisions and impact on events.

Thus, it can be argued that the EC Member States required adopting and maintaining a coherent position in order to be an effective international actor and have an impact on international events. During the Yugoslav crisis, Recognition crisis demonstrated the limits of EPC’s ability in coordinating foreign policies of the Member States and motivated them to form a common foreign policy rather than a coordination of foreign policies of the Member
States. The Yugoslav crisis also broke the deadlock on security and defence issues in Maastricht negotiations, the EC Member States realized the possibility of serious security and defence problems in the post-Cold War era and the deficiencies in the ability of EPC to influence foreign policies of most powerful Member States like Germany. Moreover, the reluctance of the US to involve the conflict led Europeans to believe that they should have taken more responsibility for their own security in the post-Cold War era (Smith, 2004: 179).

4. The Iraq Crisis

After the September 11th 2001 terrorist attacks against the United States (US), the EU Member States had adopted a relatively coherent position on the fight against terrorism and Taliban Regime in Afghanistan, but when the US Administration decided to extend its war against terrorism to Iraq and shift war from Afghanistan towards Iraq, most of the European governments and citizens opposed the US decision to extend the war to Iraq.

Most European governments and citizens willingly supported the US in its fight against Taliban and Al-Qaeda, because they regarded Osama Bin Laden and his terrorist network as a threat, but very few Europeans regarded Iraq as a threat (Grant, 2001). As there is no evidence that he has worked with international terrorist networks, deterrence, containment not confrontation seem sufficient to prevent him from attacking neighbours or using his biological and chemical weapons (Grant, 2002: 151). Most of the Europeans thought that a war against Iraq would distract attention from the war against terrorism and might lead to uncontrollable escalation and mass casualties as well as further estrangement between the Arab world and the West (Nielsen, 2003: 100). They also feared that a cornered Iraqi dictator might use his arsenal of chemical and biological weapons and would almost certainly strike out against Israel, attempting to turn the conflict into a war between the West and the Muslim World (Nielsen, 2003: 100).

On the other hand, the US Administration thought that Al-Qaeda and Iraq have a common interest in wanting to hurt the US as much as possible and in spite of the lack of evidence that Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein has collaborated with Al-Qaeda, the US Administration feared that he may give his weapons of mass destruction to terrorists, so Saddam should be deposed quickly (Grant, 2002: 152).

Some of European governments supported the US Administration’s cause in the Iraq crisis and this led to divisions among them. As Charles Grant called Iraq as Achilles heel of
EU foreign policy (Grant, 2002: 152) during the Iraq crisis in early 2003, once again after the Gulf War in 1991, EU Member States were not able to develop a common policy over Iraq. France and Germany were against the US-led war in Iraq and on 22 January 2003 on the occasion of the 40th anniversary of the Elyssée Friendship Treaty, German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder and French President Jacques Chirac decided to deepen their cooperation against a US-led war in Iraq and Chirac stated that “Germany and France have the same judgement on this crisis that war is not inevitable” (Dittrich, 2003). Schröder agreed with Chirac and declared that Germany would not vote in the UN Security Council and stated that “we agree completely to harmonize our positions as closely as possible to find a peaceful solution.” (Dittrich, 2003)

On 27 January 2003, at the General Affairs and External Relations Council, Ministers reaffirmed that “the EU’s goal remains the effective and complete disarmament of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction. The Council fully supports the UN to ensure full and immediate compliance by Iraq with all relevant resolutions of the Security Council” and they emphasized that the UN Security Council’s task of maintaining international peace and security must be respected (Dittrich, 2003).

However, three days later, on 30 January 2003, eight European leaders including Denmark, Italy, Portugal, Spain, the UK, Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland and called as The Gang of Eight signed an open letter of solidarity backing US policy towards Iraq without consulting France or Germany or the Greek Presidency. The declaration urged Europeans to unite with the US to force Saddam to give up his weapons of mass destruction and the leaders emphasized that the transatlantic relationship must not become a casualty of Saddam Hussein’s threat to world security (Dittrich, 2003).

In addition, on 7 February 2003, a group of central and eastern European countries, some of which were candidates for EU Membership including Slovakia, Lithuania, Bulgaria, Estonia, Romania, Slovenia, Albania, Croatia and Macedonia called as Vilnius 10, issued a joint letter to support the US position on Iraq. In this letter, it was stated that the US presented compelling evidence to the UN Security Council about Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction programs, its active efforts to deceive UN inspectors and its links to international terrorism (Dittrich, 2003). They stated that they understand the dangers posed by tyranny and the
special responsibility of democracies to defend their shared values; they asserted that trans-
Atlantic Community of which they are a part must unite against the threat posed by terrorism
and dictators with weapons of mass destructions and they emphasized that Iraq is violating
UN Security Council Resolutions, including Resolution 1441 and they announced that they
are ready to contribute to an international coalition to enforce its provisions and the
disarmament of Iraq (Dittrich, 2003).

These two letters were seen as direct retaliation for an anti-war position adopted by
France and Germany. Greek Prime Minister Costas Smitis as the holder of EU Presidency
stated that these initiatives did not contribute to a common approach to the problem and the
Union aimed to have a common foreign policy, so there is a need for coordination in Iraq
(Dittrich, 2003). Furthermore, French President Chirac criticized the candidate countries
which signed the letter and called their behaviour as childish and dangerous and warned it
could have an impact on their hopes of joining the EU as they missed a great opportunity to
shut up (Dittrich, 2003). As a result, the US-led war in Iraq led to divisions between the EU
Member States, US Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld called this as a division between
‘Old Europe’ including France and Germany who opposed US-led war against Iraq and ‘New
Europe’ including the Member States and Candidate States supporting US-led war against
Iraq.

In fact, the real division among the EU Member States were not between public, but
between governments, majority of the Europeans were against a US-led war against Iraq
(Brenner, 2003: 193). Moreover, Brian Crowe (2003: 535) claimed that, during the Iraq crisis,
two EU Member States, also, the permanent members of the UN Security Council, France and
the UK, tried to keep the Iraqi problem to be dealt with the UN not the EU, because they
thought that any attempt to develop a common EU position on Iraq would be more damaging
than helpful to a still fragile CFSP which was making real progress in other areas like the
Balkans and the Middle East.

Brian Crowe (2004: 32) also argued that a Europe which acts as one actor will carry
more weight, whether with the US or others than a Europe composed of individual states
acting independently. He suggested that it is an illusion to think that individual European
countries can influence the big issues representing only themselves (Crowe, 2004: 32). The
case of the UK over Iraq is the exception that proves the rule, but an effective EU, sharing the responsibility as well as the burden would be much more effective in this role than any single actor (Crowe, 2004: 32). For him, if large Member States conduct their policies independently rather than acting together, they can act less effectively and the CFSP becomes perpetually ineffective (Crowe, 2004: 32). Shifting coalitions of individual European states are no substitute, because it is the Union which alone can provide glue to keep them together and combine the resources to strengthen European efforts (Crowe, 2004: 32).

Thus, the Iraq crisis once again proved that, in order to be an effective actor in global politics, the EU should develop a coherent foreign and security policy. The division among the EU Member States during the Iraq crisis prevented them to adopt a common position, and to influence US foreign policy and affect the course of events. Therefore, lack of coherence among them toward the Iraq crisis undermined their effectiveness. According to Christopher Hill (2004: 152, 161), during the Iraq crisis, the CFSP has been almost wholly silent and Europeans have produced the silence of the Euro-lambs, divided, powerless, and apparently frozen with apprehension.

5. Conclusion

By looking at two empirical case-studies, it can be argued that the EU has failed to act as a fully-fledged coherent and effective foreign and security policy actor, due to the divisions among the EU Member States during the Yugoslav crisis and the Iraq crisis. In both cases, the existence of different national interests among the EU Member States and their preference for national interests over common European interests prevented them from agreeing on a coherent position. Consequently, this led to a loss of effectiveness and international credibility on the part of the EU as a foreign and security policy actor. In both events, the EC/EU could not act as an effective international actor, in terms of both its capacity to produce collective decisions and its impact on events.

Although the EU Member States faced difficulties in acting as a coherent and effective foreign and security policy actor, they have continued their efforts to make the EU a coherent and effective foreign and security policy actor. Each failure of the EU Member States to act as a coherent and effective actor in the domain of foreign and security policy led to the renewal of efforts to improve the EU’s foreign and security policy and make it more coherent and
effective. After the failure in the Yugoslav crisis, the CFSP was launched. In addition, during another Former Yugoslav crisis, Kosovo crisis in late 1990s, the EU Member States once again failed to stop the conflict on their own and they recognized the fact that civilian, persuasive diplomacy not supported by credible military forces for crisis management and conflict prevention could not alone be successful in preventing and managing conflicts. After the Kosovo crisis, security and defence policy of the EU with necessary defence capabilities was launched. Moreover, despite the division that occurred among the EU Member States during the Iraq crisis, the EU’s first-ever security strategy: “A Secure Europe in a Better World, European Security Strategy” was prepared by High Representative for the CFSP Javier Solana and adopted by the EU leaders at Rome European Council on 12-13 December 2003. The intention behind the preparation of European Security Strategy was to establish a common European security concept which would in the future prevent divisions among EU Member States in possible crisis, like in the Iraq crisis and make the EU a more coherent and effective foreign and security policy actor in international issues. The document primarily offers a common view of the nature of current international security environment (post-Cold War and post-9/11 international security contexts), the EU’s role within it, the shared perception of the most serious threat, the most important opportunities in that security environment and appropriate policy responses that the EU should adopt in dealing with them.

To conclude, this article argued that in order to be an effective foreign and security policy actor, the EU Member States ought to act collectively as a coherent actor within the framework of the CFSP. As observed in three empirical case-studies, their incoherence weakened the EU’s credibility and effectiveness during two prominent international events. In the future, the EU’s ability to conduct its foreign and security policy in an effective and credible manner will depend on the EU Member States’ collective choice of whether to act independently and weaken both their and the EU’s effectiveness in global politics or to act coherently within the framework of the CFSP and strengthen both their and the EU’s effectiveness, influence and international credibility in global politics.

References


